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Abstract
This study presents evidence on the role of moral support on performance in a compet-
itive environment. We take advantage of an unusual change in the Argentinean football
legislation. In August 2013, as a matter of National security, the Argentinean govern-
ment forced all the teams of the first division to play their games with only home team
supporters. Supporters of the visiting teams were not allowed to be in stadiums during
league games. We estimate the effect of this exogenous variation of supporters on team
performance, and we find that visiting teams are, on average, about 20% more likely to
lose without their supporters. Moreover, we find that the lack of supporters of the vis-
iting team increased the score differential between the home team and the visitor. The
effect of the ban is stronger for big teams, who have the highest number of supporters
when playing away. In addition, we find no evidence of changes of referees’ decisions due
to the ban, suggesting that the effect on team performance is due to the loss of moral
support rather than a change in referees hostility. As placebo test, we run the analysis
using contemporaneous cup matches, where the visiting team supporters were allowed
to attend. We find no effect of the ban on the cup games, which provides additional
empirical support to our findings. Our results offer unique and novel empirical evidence
of the importance on moral support on performance.
JEL: D01, D91, J24.
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“Qué seŕıa de un club sin el hincha. Una bolsa vaćıa. El hincha es el alma de los colores,
es el que no se ve. Es el que da todo sin esperar nada. Eso es ser hincha. Ese soy yo.”
Enrique Santos Discépolo (Fragmento de la peĺıcula “El Hincha”, 1951).
“What would be of a club without supporters? It would be an empty bag. Supporters are
the soul of the colors; they are those who are not seen. Those who give everything without
expecting nothing. That is being a supporter. That is who I am.”
Enrique Santos Discépolo (Part of the movie “El Hincha”, 1951).
1 Introduction
As humans, we spend considerable time providing moral support to others. We use pep
talks, encouraging words, and similar unverifiable soft information to boost confidence and
“motivate” others. Indeed, the use of encouragement, praise and motivation strategies is
a central theme in management, coaching, education and political marketing. Each year
billions of dollars are spent in books and counseling by people who want to be inspired
and motivated. Successful coaches are viewed as those who build up others’ confidence
(Kinlaw 1999). Even Barak Obama’s “Yes We Can” slogan has a gist of moral support on
it: to impinge a believe on his followers that an outcome that was previously thought to be
unattainable, is actually attainable now.
Why do people spend resources to morally support others? Social psychologists have
rationalized the supply of moral support with two main empirical facts. The first fact is that
self-confidence, defined as the belief to be able to succeed in a task, improves performance
(Bandura 1986). There is plenty of empirical evidence consistent with this fact within ed-
ucational, labor and competitive sports contexts (Stajkovic and Luthans (1998); Bandura
(2000); Bandura and Locke (2003)). The second fact is that self-confidence can be manipu-
lated externally. An example of this is a well-known phenomenon studied in the literature of
social-psychology coined “The Pygmalion” effect (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968), whereby
others’ expectations about own ability to perform a task can shape self-confidence and have
an impact on performance. In economic jargon, these two facts give rise for a principal
(e.g. parent, spouse, friend, teacher, boss), who is interested in improving an agent’s per-
formance, to use moral support strategically. Indeed, Benabou and Tirole (2003) formalize
this idea in a principal-agent game theoretic model in which the agent has imperfect knowl-
edge about her own ability. The principal, who has a stake in her performance, has strong
incentives to send signals to the agent that she is of high ability. This would boost agents’
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self-confidence, her interest in the task and consequently her performance. Moral support
is then formalized in economics as a confidence enhancement strategy of the principal.
Despite its prevalence and importance, the evidence of the causal effect of moral support
on performance is rather scarce. The major empirical challenge resides on the fact that
moral support is essentially endogenous. People strategically choose whether to supply or
demand moral support, how much of it, to whom to supply and from whom to demand.
For example, better performing people (being children, students, workers, or teams) attract
higher support (from parents, teachers, bosses or fans) and, at the same time, people who
receive more support perform better. This imposes a real challenge for identification of the
causal relationship between moral support and performance.
This paper addresses this challenge by taking advantage of an exogenous change in
moral support caused by an unexpected change of law in the Argentinean football league.
Following an incident in which a football supporter got killed, the authorities decided to
implement a drastic measure in the form of a ban (Act: 4810, 20 August, 2013) forbidding
the presence of teams visiting supporters during first division matches. Only local team
supporters could be at the stadium while the part destined to visitors remained empty.
This provides an unusually clean opportunity in a real-world environment to discern the
effect of moral support on performance.
Using data from 1320 matches played before and after the introduction of the ban, we
find that the probability for the visiting team to lose a match without their supporters
increases by about 20%. This effect is robust to different time and season fixed effects.
Moreover, we find that the lack of supporters of the visiting team increased the score
differential. The odds that the visiting team concedes an additional goal more than the
home team increases by 1.3 times with the law. The effect of the ban is stronger for big
teams, who have the highest number of supporters when playing away. In addition, we
find no evidence of changes of referees’ decisions due to the ban, suggesting that the effect
on team performance is due to the loss of moral support rather than a change in referees
hostility. As placebo test, we run the analysis using contemporaneous cup matches, where
the visitors supporters were allowed to attend. We find no effect of the ban on the cup
games, which provides additional empirical support to our findings.
We believe football provides a unique environment to study moral support. As stated by
Palacios-Huerta (2014, p. 2) “of the three ingredients that soccer offers, the most essential
to its success is neither the ball nor the players but the flag”. In football “you’ll never
walk alone” - unless it gets prohibited by law. According to Alabarces and Rodrigues
(1996), football is the major phenomenon of mass communication in the world, and one
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of the strongest identification practices of the popular sectors in most of Latin America
countries. Supporting a particular club is a form of identity, and this is particularly strong
for Argentinean football supporters, who do not consider themselves as spectators, but as
the twelfth player. They invent hundreds of different elaborated songs to support their
teams, they jump singing these songs during the whole match, even (or specially) when
their team is losing. They move in big hordes of people, bringing their flags where the
team plays, even thousands of kilometers away, as a signal of fidelity and support to the
“colours they love”. This particular environment of social support combined with a sudden
exogenous ban, makes the Argentinean case an ideal natural experiment. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically examine moral support and performance in
a highly competitive environment by using exogenous variation for this purpose.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the existing
literature. Section 3 sketches a simple conceptual framework of the link between moral
support and performance. Section 4 introduces the institutional context and Section 5
describes the data and the empirical specification used for the analysis. Section 6 reports
the main empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature in economics and psychology. First,
it relates to the literature highlighting the effectiveness of various forms of non-monetary
incentives on workers motivation (Deci (1971); Frey and Jegen (2001);Gneezy, Meier, and
Rey-Biel (2011)). Examples of effective non-monetary incentives are goals (Wu, Heath,
and Larrick (2008); Goerg and Kube (2012); Gómez-Miñambres (2012); Corgnet, Gómez-
Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez (2015)), interpersonal ties (Bandiera, Barankay, and
Rasul 2010), symbolic awards (Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), authority (Fehr, Herz,
and Wilkening (2013)) and autonomy (Falk and Kosfeld (2006)). We contribute to this
literature by showing unique evidence of the role of moral support as a novel non-monetary
incentive to increase workers performance.
Second, this paper contributes to the emerging literature that uses sport data to bring
insights into human behavior (for an excellent review, see Palacios-Huerta (2014)). Sport
data have been recently applied to the study of a variety of important problems such
as racial integration (Goff, McCormick, and Tollison 2002), competition in the workplace
(Brown 2011), national well-being (Kavetsos and Szymanski 2010), national culture on indi-
vidual violence (Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath 2008), favoritism and corruption (Garicano,
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Palacios-Huerta, and Prendergast 2005) and behavioral biases (Gauriot and Page (2018);
Miller and Sanjurjo (2018)). Related to this paper, Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010)
use data on football penalty kicks to identify the effect of psychological pressure on the
probability of scoring, depending on the order of kicks.1 Feri, Innocenti, and Pin (2013)
find that the effect of psychological pressure in competitive environments is moderated by
individual differences on cognitive anxiety. Closely related to our paper, Garicano, Palacios-
Huerta, and Prendergast (2005) show that social pressure biases football referees’ toward
home teams. We show that this channel is not present in the context of our study, suggesting
that the effect of supporters on team performance is direct and not through a change of the
referees’ hostility towards visiting teams. In general, we contribute to this branch of litera-
ture by combining football data with an unusual change in a law to study an understudied
psychological factor that affects performance in a highly competitive environment.
Third, our paper is also indirectly related to the literature studying the effect of praise
and recognition on performance, as long as the presence of supporters in the stadium has
some feature of recognition too. Deci (1971) shows that providing praise increases students
willingness to work on a puzzle. More recently, in a controlled field experiment with stu-
dents, Bradler, Dur, Neckermann, and Non (2016) find that unexpected public recognition
by means of a thank-you card increases students group performance. This paper com-
plements this literature in that we study a setting with repeated interaction between the
principal (supporters) and the agent (team), during a long time span, in a very competitive
environment and where the stakes involved are substantially high.
Fourth, our paper relates, to some extent, to the psychological literature of “audience
effect”. This literature considers the mere presence of an audience as responsible for a
psychological arousal with direct impact on behavior. Zajonc (1968) finds that the perfor-
mance of cockroaches was positively affected in a simple task (finding food in a straight
maze) by the presence of an audience of cockroaches, while was negatively affected in a
complex task (finding food in a maze with several turns). A similar behavior was bound in
humans beings (Butler and Baumeister 1998). According to this literature, the effect of the
audience on individuals depends very much on the type of task and therefore performance
can be both enhanced (i.e. social support hypothesis) or impaired (i.e. social pressure hy-
pothesis). Recently, the audience effect has also began to gain attention among economists.
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2014) studied the effect of audience in a public good game finding
that if there are not strategic aspects involved in the game the result is not affected by the
audience. Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) show that the presence of an audience
1See also Kocher, Lenz, and Sutter (2012) for a replication study.
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affects substantially players’ choices in the Battle of Sexes game. Although supporters in
Argentine stadiums are technically considered as the audience, their role is more active than
the rather passive role of the type of audience studied in this literature.
Finally, this paper provides evidence of one understudied factor of a well-established
phenomenon in the sport economics literature: home advantage. Home advantage, refers to
a greater success rate in home versus away competitions. It is a robust phenomenon that has
been consistently highlighted in sport competition both individually (e.g. Koning (2011))
and in teams (e.g. Gómez and Pollard (2011); Liardi and Carron (2011)).2 According to
this literature, the main reasons for the existence of home advantage are: (a) influence
of the crowd, (b) familiarity with the context, (c) travel fatigue, (d) territoriality and (e)
referee bias. Related to our paper is the work of Smith and Groetzinger (2010). They
analyze the role of attendance in home-field advantage in Major League Baseball, and find
a positive association between attendance and team performance. However, their findings
suffer from endogeneity concerns. By leveraging the unique opportunity provided by the
sudden change in law, our paper identify the relative role of the supporters, fixing all the
other factors constant.
3 Framework and Hypothesis
How can moral support be conceptualized in an economic framework? In a canonical model
in which individuals respond only to monetary incentives and have perfect information about
their own ability and payoffs, moral support would not exist. Nobody would spend time
and effort trying to enhance others’ perception about their own abilities, simply because
there would be no scope to change that perception. However, in a model that allows
uncertainty about payoffs and imperfect knowledge about own ability, then moral support
can be sustained in equilibrium. This is the gist of Benabou and Tirole (2003) paper. In
their principal-agent model, the agents have imperfect knowledge about their own ability,
and engage in a costly project when they are sufficient confident about their ability to
succeed, and in the project’s net return. As a result, the principal, who has a stake in their
performance, have strong incentives to send signals to the agents that they are of good
ability. This boosts agents’ self-confidence, their interest in the task and consequently their
performance. Moral support is then formalized as a confidence enhancement strategy of the
principal.
Why would the agent believe the principal? For this to be an equilibrium outcome
2For a comprehensive review see Carron, Loughhead, and Bray (2005) and Pollard (2006).
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the principal must have complementary private information about the task or the agents’
prospects from it. When the principal with private information makes a decision such as
encouraging the agents, it impacts agents’ willingness to perform the task as they take the
principal’s perspective in order to learn about themselves. The influence of the principal’s
decision on the agents’ behavior is then twofold: direct, through its impact on the agents’
payoff from accomplishing the task (keeping information constant), and indirect, through
the inference process. The idea is that by offering low-powered incentives, the principal
signals that she trusts the agent.
The model of Benabou and Tirole (2003) helps us understand why people spend re-
sources to provide moral support to others, and it serves as a framework to interpret the
support sport teams receive in a competitive setting. Linking the model to the context of
this study, the football players can be interpreted as the agents and the set of supporters as
the principal. The players have imperfect knowledge about their payoff from putting effort,
because they are uncertain about their own ability, or the team ability or the ability of
the other team. The supporters derive benefits from the players playing to their maximum
potential. The players play up to their potential only if they have sufficient confidence in
their own ability to succeed, and in the net return of their decisions. The supporters, with
a stake in the players’ performance, have strong incentives to manipulate signals relevant to
player’s self-knowledge, as higher self-confidence enhances players’ motivation and hence,
their performance. Supporters will want (and are willing to pay a cost) to boost players’
self-confidence, as well as their interest in winning the match. They do so by going to the
stadium and supporting the team with songs and banners. The hypothesis derived from
this framework is straightforward: teams with moral support are less likely to loose.
The framework of Benabou and Tirole (2003) may not be the only way to rationalize the
link between moral support and performance in our setting. In principle, the support in the
stadium could potentially increase visiting teams performance if, for example, it changes
the reference point of the players or players become risk seeker. These are all plausible
channels, but yet they are theoretical conjectures. The only existing formal model of moral
support and performance that we are aware of is that of Benabou and Tirole (2003). For
that reason, we motivate our research grounded on this theory without ruling out, of course,
other plausible theoretical mechanisms.
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4 Institutional Context
Since the conception of professional football in Argentina in 1931, violence around football
games has been a constant real problem for the country. According to the NGO “Salvemos
al Futbol”, up to date, 323 people have died due to violence episodes in Argentinian foot-
ball matches. Despite the implementation of different safety measures, such as increasing
the number of police agents in games or installing security cameras in the stadiums, the
magnitude of the problem has only worsen with time. Figure 1 shows the evolution of
the number of victims in Argentinean football from the 1934 to the 2014. Excluding the
massive tragedy of 1968 during a River Plate vs. Boca Juniors match3, the overall trend
over the past century indicates an increasing number of deaths in stadiums during football
matches. Recently, the number of victims increased dramatically achieving its maximum in
the triennium 2012-2014.
Figure 1: Deaths from violence in Argentinean football
This Figure shows the number of deaths due to episodes of violence in stadiums during
professional football matches in Argentina. The database was constructed based on the
information provided by the NGO “Salvemos el fútbol” and published by the newspaper
“La Nación”
The 10th of June of 2013 marked a turning point in the history of Argentinean football.
During the match of the first division (Primera División) between Club Atlético Lanús and
3This tragedy, known as “Tragedia de la puerta 12”, was originated by a locked exit: the pressure caused
by the mass of Boca Juniors supporters trying to exit caused the death of seventy one supporters.
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Estudiantes de La Plata, a Lanús supporter got killed by a police rubber balled shot. Follow-
ing this incident, the AFA (Asociación de Fútbol Argentino) together with the A.Pre.Vi.De
(Agencia Prevención Violencia en el Deporte) decided to implement a drastic measure in
order to limit violence. The measure imposed was in the form of a ban forbidding the pres-
ence of visiting team supporters during first division matches (Act: 4810, 20 August, 2013).
Only local team supporters could be at the stadium while the part destined to visitors had
to remain empty. The measure is still in place at the moment, though it has been lifted by
the government in some selected matches after 2015.
5 Data and Identification Strategy
5.1 Data
To assess the impact of the ban on team performance, we collected data of Argentinean first
division matches that were played between August 2011 and December 2014. Our main web-
site of reference was www.mismarcadores.es. In total, the dataset constructed contains 1320
matches: 380 matches for each of the first three seasons (2011/2012, 2012/2013, 2013/2014)
and 180 matches for the season 2014/2015.4 For each match we recorded the final result,
the number of goals scored by each team and the number of red cards that referees held up
in front of players of each team.5 Importantly, we don’t include data after 2015 because,
since then, the government started to lift the ban in some selected matches as pilot exercises
and this would bring endogeneity to the analysis.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables of interest (Panel A) and of
ancillary variables (Panel B). For each variable, Table 1 reports its mean before and after
the ban, the mean difference, its standard error and the result of a mean comparison t-test.
The last columns show the number of matches for which each variable is observed both,
before and after the ban. Panel A gives preliminary overview of the main results of the
paper. The share of matches in which the visiting teams lose is on average greater after the
implementation of the ban, with the difference being statistically significant (p=0.06). The
score differences in favor of the home teams increased too (p=0.08), resulting mainly as a
consequences of the number of goals conceded by the visiting teams (p=0.06). Moreover,
there is no significant difference in the average number of red cards showed to players of
4In the first three seasons, teams played twice with each of the other team, whereas in the 2014/2015
season called “Torneo Transición” teams played only once against the other teams.
5In addition, we collected data on total shots, yellow cards, corners and ball possession, but we don’t use
these data for our analysis because data for those variables are not available for all the seasons before the
ban.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Main Variables
Mean Before Mean After Diff. Std. Error Obs. Before Obs. After
Visiting team losing (share) 0.40 0.47 0.07∗∗ 0.027 740 580
Score difference (T1-T2) 0.27 0.41 0.14∗ 0.082 740 580
Goals scored by Home Team 1.23 1.34 0.11∗ 0.062 740 580
Goals scored by Visiting Team 0.96 0.93 -0.03 0.055 740 580
Red Cards to Home Team 0.18 0.15 -0.03 0.024 739 579
Red Cards to Visiting Team 0.27 0.23 -0.04 0.029 739 579
Panel B: Ancilliary Variables
Mean Before Mean After Diff. Std. Error Obs. Before Obs. After
Yellow cards to Home Team 2.47 2.27 -0.20∗∗ 0.096 364 579
Yellow cards to Visiting Team 3.01 2.77 -0.25∗∗ 0.102 364 579
Ball possession Home Team 52.09 51.55 -0.54 0.796 132 569
Ball possession Visiting Team 47.58 48.45 0.87 0.840 132 569
Shoots Home Team 12.09 13.37 1.28∗∗∗ 0.356 215 571
Shoots Visiting Team 10.03 10.66 0.63∗∗ 0.307 215 571
Shoots on target Home Team 4.91 4.79 -0.13 0.182 215 571
Shoots on target Visiting Team 3.86 3.68 -0.18 0.168 215 571
Shoots out Home Team 7.17 8.61 1.44∗∗∗ 0.296 208 571
Shoots out Visiting Team 6.24 6.98 0.74∗∗∗ 0.256 208 570
Corners Home Team 4.93 5.24 0.31 0.207 215 571
Corners Visiting Team 4.02 4.12 0.1 0.187 215 571
Faults Home Team 12.36 12.91 0.55 0.344 215 571
Faults Visiting Team 12.70 13.55 0.85∗∗ 0.355 215 571
This table reports the summary statistics of our dataset. Columns (1) and (2) report the average values before
and after the ban, respectively. Column (3) reports the difference between the averages before and after the
ban and Column (4) its standard deviation. The last two columns report the number of observations before
and after the ban for each variable. Panel A presents information on the main variable of interest and Panel B
presents information on ancillary variables we use to support the analysis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%.
both teams, home and visiting, before and after the ban. The rest of the paper shows that
these preliminary results are robust to different econometric specifications.
Panel B of Table 1 reports a significant reduction of the number of yellow cards per match
shown to players from both home and visiting teams, which is consistent with referees not
becoming more hostile towards visiting teams players after the ban. We also observe a
statistically significant increase in the frequency of shots to goal after the ban, but this
is due to a rising number of shots out of target rather than an increase in the number of
shots on target. This suggests that the increase in the score differential we observe after
the ban is probably the consequence of visiting teams defenders performing worse rather
than an increase in the chances created by the home team strikers. This is also consistent
with the fact that the average number of faults committed by the visiting team significantly
increased from 12.70 to 13.55.6
6Unfortunately the data for these ancillary variables were not available for all seasons before the ban.
For this reason, we do not include them in our regression analysis.
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5.2 Identification Strategy
The aim of this study is to identify the effect on team performance of switching from
playing a football match as the visiting team in a stadium with both local and visiting
team supporters versus playing a football match as the visiting team in a stadium with
only local team supporters. The latent variable is overall performance of visiting teams.
As proxy for team performance we use the result of the match and the score difference,
calculated as the difference between the number of goals scored by the local team and
the goals scored by the visiting team. We estimate a Linear Probability model for the
probability of the visiting team losing a match, and an ordered Logit model for the score
difference. In both specifications, the dependent variable is regressed on a dummy variable
indicating whether the ban applies to that match or not.
Our empirical strategy essentially compares the results of the matches in the Argentinean
first league played before the ban to results of matches played after the ban was introduced.
The identification assumption relies on the non existence of other forces that could affect
the result of the matches and appear contemporaneously with the ban or in the period just
after. In other words, we assume that the expected result of every match played before the
day in which the law started to be in force and after that day would be the same if the ban
would have never been implemented.
In Section 6.6 we perform a variety of robustness checks to ensure the validity of our
results. We first conduct a placebo test using the matches from the national cup tournament
(“Copa Argentina”) instead of the league ones. The national cup is played every year
by teams from first and lower divisions of the AFA, and it fits perfectly as a placebo
experiment since the ban for visiting team supporters does not apply to the cup, plus the
games were played contemporaneously to the first division league. Second, we replicate the
main analysis dropping the matches played by teams that got promoted or relegated in
2013, and the ones played by teams that did not participate in all the four seasons. Third,
we re-run the first specification including season and round fixed effects, to control for
heterogeneity within a season, and we study the sensitivity of our results to the introduction




Figure 2 reports the share of matches in which the visiting teams lost by week (turn) and
its average, before and after the implementation of the ban. The evidence is based on
1,320 matches, i.e. 580 treated matches played after the implementation of the ban and 740
control matches played before. Before the ban, the probability that the away team looses a
match is around 40%.7 This probability increases to almost 47% with the ban, implying a
15.64% average increase in the probability that visiting teams lose after the ban.
Figure 2: Ratio of Matches with the Visiting Team Losing
This Figure shows the share of matches lost by visiting teams by week/turn (in dots) and its
average (the horizontal dotted lines) before and after the ban. The red vertical line represents the
date of the implementation of the law, the black vertical lines are end/beginning of each season.
7The remaining 60% is the sum of matches in which the visiting team win and draws.
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Table 2: Effects of the Ban on the Probability of Losing as a Visitor
OLS Estimation
Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Presence of the Ban 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.080∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.042)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
Dummies Match X
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555 555
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X X
OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a match for the visiting team. Controls include
dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies
for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction
in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
6.2 Main Result
Table 2 presents estimates of linear probability models of the effect of the ban on the
probability of losing a match for the visiting team. The simplest cross section specification
is the following:
yit = α+ βLit + εit (1)
Where yit is a dummy which takes value 1 if the visiting team won match i that was
played at week t; α is a constant, and Lit is a dummy taking value 1 when the Law is
in force.8 We further control for all time-invariant unobserved components related to the
intrinsic characteristics of each team or pair of teams that identify a particular match
including control dummies for home team, visiting team and match.
Table 2 reports the coefficients of estimating eq. (1) with OLS for alternative specifica-
tions. The specification in Column (1) estimates the model without any control variables.
The probability that the visiting team loses a match in the period in which the law is in
8Note that match i means that a particular team is playing at home while another particular team is
playing as visitor. If the same teams play at another stadium (the one of the visitor usually) it is classified
as a different match. The time index t ranges from 1 to 133, since there are 7 seasons in our database and
in each seasons there are 19 weeks/turns.
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force is, on average, 6.3 percentage points greater than before, equivalent to an increase of
15.64%. Columns (2) to (4) reports OLS estimates of eq. (1) with standard errors clustered
by team or matches. This result holds also for different specifications. In the remaining
columns we add a dummy for the local team (Column 5), for the visiting team (Column
6), for both (Column 7) and for match (Column 8). In these last four specifications, the
size of the coefficient increase. Overall, Table 2 shows robust empirical evidence that the
ban increased the probability of losing a match when playing as an visiting team. Our
preferred specification is reported in Column (6), where we control for visiting team fixed
effect, because all the unobservable time invariant components related only to the visiting
team are taking into account. In this specification, the ban increases the probability of
losing a match for the visiting team by 22.1%. With this analysis we provide quantitative
evidence that the absence of teams’ supporters has a strong negative effect on the overall
performance of the team and as a consequence, in the presence of the ban, teams are more
likely to lose when playing as visitors.
Table A1 shows results from a Logit model estimating the likelihood of losing a match
for a visiting team in the presence of the ban. Again, Column (1) reports the coefficient
of the Law treatment without any additional controls. As for the linear regression model,
the presence of the ban has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of losing a
match for the visiting team. Results do not change and remain significant at 1% level
when standard errors are clustered by home team, visiting team and matches and when
controlling for team and match fixed effect.
6.3 Score Difference
In this subsection we complement our main analysis by studying the effect of the ban on
another proxy of relative team performance: the difference between the number of goals
scored by the home team and the number of goals scored by the visiting team. We refer
to this measure as “score difference”. The specification that we use is exactly the same as
in equation (1), with the difference that as dependent variable we use the score difference
instead of a dummy for visiting team losing. Table 3 reports the estimated exponential
coefficients of an Ordered Logit model on the effect of the ban on the score difference. As
before, our preferred specification is in Column (6) where dummies for the visiting team are
included. We find that the odds that the visiting team concedes an additional goal more
than the opponent are 1.3 times greater after the ban.
In the Appendix (Table A2) we analyze the effect of the ban on the absolute number of
goals scored by each team separately. Concerning the number of goals scored by the local
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Table 3: Effects of the Ban on Score Difference
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Dependent Variable: Goals Difference in the final result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Presence of the Ban 1.203∗ 1.203∗ 1.203∗ 1.203∗ 1.183∗ 1.309∗∗ 1.302∗∗
(0.120) (0.118) (0.120) (0.121) (0.118) (0.142) (0.158)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X
Maximum Likelihood estimation of an Ordered Logit Model of the effect of the ban on the goals difference.
Goals difference is computed by subtracting the number of goals scored by the visiting team to the number
of goals scored by the home team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7) and
dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors
in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in
Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7). *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%.
team (Panel A), our preferred specification reported in Column (6) shows that the presence
of the ban significantly increases the local team absolute number of goals scored. On the
other hand, the ban does not have a significant effect on the number of goals scored by
the visiting team (Panel B). This leads to the conclusion that the score difference increases
mainly because the local teams score more rather than the visiting teams score less. This
result, together with the fact that the frequency of shots on target for the home team did
not increase while shots out of target did (Table 1), suggests that the primary cause of the
observed score difference is driven by a worse performance of the visiting teams’ defenders.
However, this is only suggestive rather conclusive evidence.
6.4 Heterogeneous Effects
Which type of team is most affected by the ban? The main argument put forward in this
paper implies that the teams who were used to get higher amount of support before the
ban will be those who would suffer the lack of moral support the most after the ban. If we
observed that this is the case, it would provide further evidence for fans support being the
driving force of the main effects of the ban. To address this question, we take advantage
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that Argentinean football league has a recognized clear distinction between the five biggest
team, and the rest. These teams, called “the big five” (los cinco grandes), are Boca Juniors,
River Plate, San Lorenzo, Racing Club and Independiente. These clubs bring, by far, the
highest number of supporters to the stadiums, have the biggest budgets and won most of
the leagues and cups.9
In order to test whether the “big five” teams were more affected by the law than the
rest, we estimate the following Linear Probability regression equation on the probability of
losing a match for the visiting team controlling for heterogeneous effect for one of the two
teams being one of the “big five”:
yit = α+ βLit + γzi + δzi ∗ Lit + εit (2)
Where yit and Lit are as described in eq. (1), while zi is a dummy which takes value
one if the team playing local is a Big 5 in the specification in Panel A - Table 4 and it takes
value one if the visiting team is a Big 5 in the specification of Panel B - Table 4. The main
coefficient of interest is the interaction term between the presence of the ban and the team
being a “big five”. From the last row of Panel A - Table 4 we can see that the fact that the
local team is a “big five” does not change the effect of the ban on the probability of losing.
However, the probability that the visiting team loses after the ban is significantly higher if
the visiting team is among the “big five”, as the last row of Panel B - Table 4 shows. Note
that the coefficient of the interaction term between the ban and the visiting team being a
“big five” is negative and significant at 10% level (Column 6).
As expected, the effect of the ban is stronger for big teams, who have the highest number
of supporters when playing away. More importantly, we confirm that, in absolute terms, the
presence of the ban is negatively affecting the visiting team rather than positively affecting
the home team.
6.5 Referees Behavior
Does the ban affect the hostility of the referees towards the visiting teams? Existing lit-
erature shows that referees can biased the result of a game (Sutter and Kocher (2004);
Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, and Prendergast (2005)). One of the possible observable ways
in which a referee can influence a game is by showing yellow or red cards to players in an
unfair way (Boyko, Boyko, and Boyko 2007). While a yellow card still allows the player
9See the following link for further information on the Big 5: http://www.thebubble.com/who-are-
argentinas-big-five-football-clubs/.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects
OLS Estimation
Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
Presence of the Ban 0.049 0.049∗ 0.049 0.049 0.037 0.076∗∗ 0.065∗
(0.031) (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.027) (0.033) (0.034)
Local team is a big 5 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.083∗∗∗ 0.055 0.074
(0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.043) (0.025) (0.049) (0.078)
Local team big 5 * Ban 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.056 0.056 0.047
(0.066) (0.065) (0.074) (0.070) (0.058) (0.073) (0.072)
Panel B
Presence of the Ban 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.029) (0.038) (0.035)
Visiting team is a big 5 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.043 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗
(0.043) (0.028) (0.049) (0.040) (0.028) (0.018) (0.078)
Visiting team big 5 * Ban -0.089 -0.089∗ -0.089 -0.089 -0.089 -0.096∗ -0.096
(0.065) (0.052) (0.052) (0.065) (0.052) (0.047) (0.068)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X
Panel A: OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a match for the visiting team controlling
for the local team being among the best five teams in the league. Panel B: OLS estimation of the effect of the ban
the probability of losing a match for the visiting team controlling for the visiting team being among the best five
teams in the league. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7) and dummies for visiting team
in Columns (6) and (7). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction
in Columns (4), (7). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
16
Table 5: Effect of the ban on Red Cards
OLS Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Number of red cards shown to local team player
Presence of the Ban -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.037 -0.035 -0.042 -0.045
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.034)
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Number of red cards shown to visiting team player
Presence of the Ban -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.042 -0.029 -0.029 -0.035
(0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.046)
Controls
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
Dummies Match X
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555 555
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X X
Panel A: OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the number of red cards shown to local team players. Panel B:
OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the number of red cards shown to visiting team players. Controls include
dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies
for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction
in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
to stay in the game, a red one has a consequence that the player is immediately expelled
from the game.10 The lack of visiting supporters could in principle make the referees more
hostile towards the visiting team players. We test this conjecture by estimating eq. (1)
using as outcome variable the number of red cards shown by the referees in the matches in
our sample. Table 5 reports the results of an OLS estimation. Panel A presents the analysis
for red cards shown to the local team players and Panel B the red cards shown to the away
teams. On average the number of red cards went from 0.18 in a match before the ban, to
0.15, after the ban for home teams and from 0.27 in a match before the ban, to 0.23, after
the ban for visiting teams. Column (6) shows no significant change with respect to the
10The referee disposes of several other instruments to affect the result (e.g. adding extra time, increasing
the number of penalties). Unfortunately, we do not have access to these data over the period of analysis of
this study.
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number of red cards after ban with for both visiting and home teams. This result confirms
that there is no evidence of a change in referee behavior due to the ban, which supports the
hypothesis that the effect on team performance is due to the loss of moral support rather
than a change in referees hostility.
6.6 Robustness Checks
As discussed in Section 5.2, our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the
presence of the ban is orthogonal to determinants of team performance at the match-week
level. In this sub-section we perform three robustness checks which reinforce the internal
validity of our main result.
6.6.1 Counterfactual Experiment
The ideal counterfactual group for our empirical analysis would be one in which the same
teams play contemporaneously to the period we use for the analysis but in a context in
which the ban is not in place. Fortunately, the Argentine setting provides such an ideal
counterfactual. We exploit the fact that the AFA did not implement the ban for matches
played in the contemporaneous tournament “Copa Argentina”.11 This constitutes the per-
fect counterfactual, as they were games played at the same time span of the League, by
the same teams of the League but with the away supporters being allowed to attend the
stadiums. To test whether the ban had an effect on the probability of losing a match as a
visiting team, we estimate eq. (1) using matches played for the “Copa Argentina” instead
of matches played in the League. Table A3 presents the results. The coefficient of the OLS
estimation for the usual specification, reported in Column (6) is not statistically significant.
This provides further support for the fact that it is the lack of supporters that worsen vis-
iting teams performance, instead of being some unobserved factor contemporaneous to the
ban.
6.6.2 Excluding Promoted and Relegated Teams
The implementation of the ban started two weeks before the end of the season 2012/2013
and the beginning of the season 2013/2014. As mentioned in Section 5, there have been no
changes in the league structure or in the rules from one season to another. However, three
teams, Independiente, Union de Santa Fé and San Mart́ın de Tucumán, got relegated to
the second division while three other teams, Olimpo de Bah́ıa Blanca, GELP and Rosario
11The “Copa Argentina” started in 2011, although other two editions were played in 1969 and 1970.
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Central, got promoted to the first division. These two groups of teams may differ in ways
that are correlated with our dependent variable. Indeed, they do differ in the geographical
position of their stadium and the average number of visiting supporters. To account for
this concern, on top of including team fixed effects, we run as a robustness check the main
specification excluding all matches played by these six teams. As shown in table A4, our
main results remain robust to this specification.
As an extra robustness check, we perform the same analysis excluding all teams that got
promoted or relegated at least once in the study time span, restricting the sample to the
twelve teams that participated in all the seasons.12. Again, as Table A5 shows, our results
are robust to this analysis.
6.6.3 Time Fixed Effects
It is well known that football teams do not play every game at the same level. In particular,
if a team has to play several matches in short amount of time, players may put less effort in
some “less important” games, or coaches may reserve some players for particular matches.
The time of the season with higher frequency of games is not random, and the number
of matches the teams play (being league matches, national cup or continental cup) is not
random either. Usually, good teams play high frequency of games in the beginning of the
season, and only the best teams keep the same frequency until the end. Since the ban does
not apply to non-league matches, coaches may have decided to change the distribution of
energy between home matches and away matches among league, national cup, continental
cup, and this could become a confounding factor threatening our identification strategy.
In order to test whether our results are robust to a possible change in the coach strat-
egy for visiting teams within a season, we run two additional robustness checks. First
we estimate our main specification with half-season fixed effects (apertura/clausura) and
turn/week fixed effects (from 1 to 19). In this way every single turn/week within a season
is compared to the correspondent week/turn in other seasons. In a second regression, we
add month fixed effects (from 1 to 12) to compare all matches played in a particular month
of the year. Tables A6 and A7 report results of this analysis. As it can be seen, all the
coefficients of interest remain significant and the magnitude of the effect is approximately
the same as in the basic model of Table 2 for the first specification while increases by 1
percent in the second model. These results rule out any potential change of visiting teams
performance that could have happened due to time, other than the ban, confirming the
12The teams in the restricted sample are: Arsenal Sarandi, Atletico Rafaela, Belgrano, Boca Juniors,
Estudiantes, Godoy Cruz, Lanus, Newell’s, Racing Club, San Lorenzo, Tigre, Velez
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validity of our identification strategy.
7 Concluding Remarks
To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical evidence on the effect
of moral support on performance in a natural competitive environment. Our identifica-
tion strategy takes advantage of an unusual change in the Argentinean football legislation
occurred in August 2013, which prohibited supporters to be present at the stadium when
their teams play away. We find that a sudden and unexpected lack of in-stadium support
increases, in average, 20% the probability that the visiting team looses and increases the
odds that the visiting team concedes an additional goal more than the home team by 1.3
times. Furthermore, we show that the effect of the ban is stronger for the biggest teams,
who were used to have high number of visiting supporters before the ban. In addition, we
find no evidence of changes of referees’ decisions due to the ban, suggesting that the effect
on team performance is due to the loss of moral support rather than a change in referees
hostility. As placebo test, we run the analysis using contemporaneous cup matches, where
the visiting team supporters were allowed to attend. We find no effect of the ban on the
cup games, which provides additional empirical support to our findings. Our results are
robust to a set of alternative specifications.
These findings are novel, and as such, they open new avenues for future research on
the effect of moral support on individual and team performance. The research topic is
only nascent. Laboratory and field experiments can be designed to study whether the
effect of moral support varies with the context, with the degree of competitiveness of the
environment, with the way moral support is provided or with who provides it. It would be
also interesting to study gender differences on the effect of moral support on performance,
and whether the effects are different depending on whether the agent receiving support is an
individual or a team. Finally, it would be interesting to test whether the effects we find in
the Argentinean football context can be replicated in other contexts, by using other sources
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Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Presence of the Ban (d) 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.016) (0.032) (0.031) (0.041)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
Dummies Match X
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 837
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555 296
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X X
Maximum likelihood estimation of a logit model of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a match for the visiting
team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6)
and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by
match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Goals Scored
Table A2: Effect of the ban on Goals Scored
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Number of goals scored by the local team
Presence of the Ban 1.195∗ 1.195∗∗ 1.195 1.195∗ 1.152 1.302∗∗ 1.265∗
(0.120) (0.109) (0.147) (0.119) (0.112) (0.172) (0.152)
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Number of goals scored by the visiting team
Presence of the Ban 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.940 0.901 0.894
(0.0965) (0.103) (0.110) (0.0955) (0.114) (0.127) (0.112)
Controls
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X
]Panel A: Maximum Likelihood estimation of an ordered Logit Model of the effect of the ban on the number
of goals scored by the local team. Panel B:Maximum Likelihood Estimation of an ordered Logit Model of
the effect of the ban on the number of goals scored by the visiting team. Controls include dummies for
home team in Columns (5) and (7) and dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7). Beta coefficients
reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns
(2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7). ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
25
Robustness
National Cup Placebo Test
Table A3: Main Regression using Cup Matches
OLS Estimation
Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Presence of the Ban 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 -0.038 0.123 0.202
(0.083) (0.080) (0.083) (0.084) (0.112) (0.135) (0.254)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
N 161 161 161 161 161 161 161
Number of Clusters 58 74 160 58 74 160
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X
OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a match for the visiting team. Sample:
all matches of the Copa Argentina between August 2011 and December 2015. Controls include dummies
for home team in Columns (5) and (7) and dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7). Beta
coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home
team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in
Columns (4), (7). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Excluding Promoted and Relegated Teams
Table A4: Effects of the Ban on the Probability of Losing as a Visitor
OLS Estimation
Sample: matches played by al teams but Independiente, Union Santa Fe, San Martin de Tucumán,
Olimpo de Bah́ıa Blanca, GELP and Rosario Central
Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Presence of the Ban 0.062∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.062∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.071∗
(0.033) (0.027) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.043)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
Dummies Match X
N 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
Number of Clusters 19 19 319 19 19 319 319
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X X
OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a match for the visiting team. Sample: all
matches but the ones played by the teams that got promoted or relegated in 2013, i.e. Independiente, Union Santa
Fe, San Martin de Tucumán, Olimpo de Bah́ıa Blanca, GELP and Rosario Central. Controls include dummies for
home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in
Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by
home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns
(4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table A5: Effects of the Ban on the Probability of Losing as a Visitor
OLS Estimation
Sample: matches played by teams that participated in all the analyzed seasons
Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Presence of the Ban 0.081∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.081∗ 0.081∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.085∗ 0.089
(0.047) (0.033) (0.044) (0.046) (0.033) (0.045) (0.047) (0.055)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
Dummies Match X
N 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457
Number of Clusters 12 12 132 12 12 132 132
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X X
OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a match for the visiting team. Sample: all matches
but the ones played by the teams that got promoted or relegated during the whole analyzed period. Controls include
dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies
for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction
in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table A6: Model with half-season and round dummies
OLS Estimation
Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Presence of the Ban 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.049∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.076∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.033) (0.032) (0.043)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
Dummies Match X
Dummy Half-Season X X X X X X X X
Dummies Week/Round X X X X X X X X
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555 555
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X X
OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a match for the visiting team controlling for dummy
for half-season(Apertura/Clausura), and round dummies (from 1 to 19). Further controls include dummies for home
team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column
(8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team
in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and
(8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table A7: Model with month dummies
OLS Estimation
Dependent Variable: =1 if away team loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Presence of the Ban 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.031) (0.042)
Dummies Home Team X X
Dummies Away Team X X
Dummies Match X
Dummies Month X X X X X X X X
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Number of Clusters 25 25 555 25 25 555 555
Cluster Home Team X X
Cluster Away Team X X
Cluster Match X X X
OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a match for the visiting team controlling for month
dummies. Further controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns
(6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by
match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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